The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political "Backwardness" in Historical Perspective
A Brilliant Paper by lan S. Lustick
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Propelled by the oil boom of the mid-1970s the Middle East emerged as the world's
fastest growing region.' Hopes and expectations were high for Arab political consoli-
dation, economic advancement, and cultural efflorescence. With falling oil prices and
a devastating war between Iran and Iraq, these hopes had dimmed somewhat by the early 1980s. In 1985, however, the spectacular image of an Arab great power was
still tantalizing. A Pan-Arab state, wrote two experts on the region, would include a total area of 13.7 million square kilometers,
second only to the Soviet Union and considerably larger than Europe, Canada, China, or the United States.... By 2000 it would have more people than either
of the two superpowers. This state would contain almost two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves. It would also have enough capital to finance its own economic and social development. Conceivably, it could feed itself.... Access
to a huge market could stimulate rapid industrial growth. Present regional in- equalities could ultimately be lessened and the mismatch between labor-surplus and labor-short areas corrected. The aggregate military strength and political influence of this strategically located state would be formidable.... It is easy to comprehend why this dream has long intoxicated Arab nationalists.2
Within ten years, however, this assessment sounded more like a fairy tale than a
scenario. Indeed the last two decades have been dispiriting for Arab nationalists, not only measured against the prospect of a great national state, but compared to levels of
I am grateful for helpful comments made on preliminary drafts of this article by Thomas Callaghy,
Melani Cammett, Avery Goidstein, Steven Heydemann, Friedrich Kratochwil, Sevket Pamuk, and this journal's anonymous reviewers. The paper on which this article is based was originally prepared for a January 1996 workshop on "Regionalism and the Middle East" organized under the auspices of the Joint Near and Middle East Committee of the Social Science Research Council.
1. El Mallakh 1978,195.
2. Drysdale and Blake 1985, 225. For similar expectations and scenarios of Arab unity, prosperity, and
power, see Kerr 1982, 2; and El Mallakh 1978, 186-89. On the potential for a great Arab state, see, for example, Waterbury 1978, 53-55, 100; Luciani and Salame 1988, 13; Salame 1988a, 264, 278; and Sira-
geldin 1988, 204.
International Organization 51, 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 653-83
© 1997 by The 10 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
a devastating war between Iran and Iraq, these hopes had dimmed somewhat by the early 1980s. In 1985, however, the spectacular image of an Arab great power was
still tantalizing. A Pan-Arab state, wrote two experts on the region, would include a total area of 13.7 million square kilometers,
second only to the Soviet Union and considerably larger than Europe, Canada, China, or the United States.... By 2000 it would have more people than either
of the two superpowers. This state would contain almost two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves. It would also have enough capital to finance its own economic and social development. Conceivably, it could feed itself.... Access
to a huge market could stimulate rapid industrial growth. Present regional in- equalities could ultimately be lessened and the mismatch between labor-surplus and labor-short areas corrected. The aggregate military strength and political influence of this strategically located state would be formidable.... It is easy to comprehend why this dream has long intoxicated Arab nationalists.2
Within ten years, however, this assessment sounded more like a fairy tale than a
scenario. Indeed the last two decades have been dispiriting for Arab nationalists, not only measured against the prospect of a great national state, but compared to levels of
I am grateful for helpful comments made on preliminary drafts of this article by Thomas Callaghy,
Melani Cammett, Avery Goidstein, Steven Heydemann, Friedrich Kratochwil, Sevket Pamuk, and this journal's anonymous reviewers. The paper on which this article is based was originally prepared for a January 1996 workshop on "Regionalism and the Middle East" organized under the auspices of the Joint Near and Middle East Committee of the Social Science Research Council.
1. El Mallakh 1978,195.
2. Drysdale and Blake 1985, 225. For similar expectations and scenarios of Arab unity, prosperity, and
power, see Kerr 1982, 2; and El Mallakh 1978, 186-89. On the potential for a great Arab state, see, for example, Waterbury 1978, 53-55, 100; Luciani and Salame 1988, 13; Salame 1988a, 264, 278; and Sira-
geldin 1988, 204.
International Organization 51, 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 653-83
© 1997 by The 10 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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